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Abstract 
 
In the automobile industry, as in many tradable goods markets, firms earn their highest market 
share within their domestic market. This home market advantage persists despite substantial 
integration of international markets during the past several decades. The goal of this paper is to 
quantify the supply- and demand-driven sources of the home market advantage and to 
understand their implications for international trade and investment. Building on the random 
coefficients demand model developed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), we estimate 
demand and supply in the automobile industry for nine countries across three continents, 
allowing for unobserved taste and cost variation at the car model and market levels. While trade 
and foreign production costs as well as taste heterogeneity matter for market outcomes, we find 
that preference for domestic brands is the single most important driver of home market 
advantage - even after controlling for brand histories and dealer networks. 
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1 Introduction
In tradable goods industries, it is typical for firms to earn their highest market shares in their
domestic market. This home market advantage persists despite substantial integration of interna-
tional markets during the past several decades. There is no shortage of explanations (e.g., trade
costs, investment frictions, home preference, taste heterogeneity for characteristics) for this empir-
ical regularity, but di↵erent explanations have substantially di↵erent policy implications. The goal
of this paper is to quantify the sources of the home market advantage, and to understand the im-
plications of these frictions for international trade and investment. In particular, what is the role of
tari↵ and non-tari↵ barriers, transportation costs, and foreign production costs in explaining global
market outcomes? How important are consumer preferences, either for particular characteristics
or simply for national brands? The automobile industry provides an interesting case for analyzing
these questions. The industry accounts for over 10 percent of world trade in manufactured goods
(WTO, 2013) and bears the features of many oligopolistic industries producing di↵erentiated and
tradable goods, while domestic producers command a dominant share in their home markets.
Apart from its importance in world trade and manufacturing employment, the availability of
data also makes the auto industry suitable for our analysis. We have compiled a rich and unique
dataset of global demand and supply. The demand data informs us about prices and quantities
(as opposed to sales revenue only) by model as well as several characteristics such as horsepower,
size, weight and fuel e ciency in nine countries across three continents. On the supply side, we
have worldwide data on the assembly plant locations of each model. We propose a structural
model which exploits two features of the data to separate preference-based incentives to purchase
local products from supply side frictions such as trade and investment costs. First, the availability
of price data allows us to measure the willingness to pay for models. Second, the prevalence of
foreign direct investment (FDI) provides variation between national brand identity and assembly
location, helping to disentangle their demand and supply e↵ects. Moreover, we are able to separately
identify country-level preferences for characteristics (such as fuel e ciency) from home preference—
an innate preference for purchasing local products.1
1In a world with trade costs and increasing returns to scale, local producers may obtain larger national market
shares for reasons distinct from home preference if they happen to supply the goods that are in high relative demand
there (Krugman, 1980).
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Separating the underlying drivers of home market advantage is important to understand how
globalization a↵ects market outcomes and welfare. In particular, consider the response to trade
liberalization. In the absence of preference-based drivers, one would expect the home market
advantage to vanish if all trade barriers were removed. As pointed out by Auer (2014), if cross-
country heterogeneity in taste for characteristics is a strong feature of the economy, trade will
respond sluggishly after a trade liberalization. Strong home preference would further weaken the
response.
Traditionally, models of international trade have relied on relatively restrictive demand systems
(e.g. constant elasticity of substitution in Krugman 1980, Eaton and Kortum 2002, Melitz 2003,
and Anderson and van Wincoop 2003) to analyze market outcomes.2 While these approaches rep-
resent tractable means of analysis, they may be limited in their ability to capture rich substitution
patterns that are a feature of horizontally di↵erentiated oligopolistic industries such as cars. Quan-
titative applications have also been limited by the availability of only revenue data without credible
price and quantity information. As a result, they may lead to biased estimates of trade costs and an
underappreciation of preference di↵erences across national markets. We incorporate a random coef-
ficients approach to estimating demand, allowing for both within- and across-market heterogeneity
in consumer preferences. This more flexible approach enables us to consistently estimate demand-
and supply-driven mechanisms behind market segmentation.3 Our approach further enables the
estimation of costs of foreign production from detailed industry level data and extends the analysis
of recent quantitative trade models with multinational production (Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare
2013, Arkolakis, Ramondo, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yeaple 2013, and Tintelnot 2014), which were
also limited by the availability of only revenue data on multinationals’ foreign a liate sales for the
aggregate manufacturing sector.
We build on the random coe cients demand model developed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995), who study the U.S. automobile market. This framework uses a flexible structural approach
2With the notable exception of non-homothetic preferences (Fieler (2011), Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman
(2011), Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2014)) which are used to rationalize a certain pattern in the trade data, namely
the prevalence of north-north trade. However, in that literature consumer preferences are identical across countries
and it is income levels that vary.
3In previous work (Cos¸ar, Grieco, and Tintelnot 2015), we estimated supply-side border frictions in wind turbine
trade using detailed geographic data on firm sales.
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to recover firm markups in a di↵erentiated products market with multi-product firms.4 Due to the
knowledge of assembly locations, we can include trade cost shifters as instruments for price in the
demand estimation. After recovering demand elasticities, we back out costs via optimal pricing
strategies. Using variation in assembly and headquarter locations, we estimate trade and foreign
production costs, as well as the cost of supplying of each characteristic. We allow for the fact that
the source location is endogenously chosen from the set of all available plants. Overall, we estimate
both demand and supply in a consistent framework that allows for unobserved demand and cost
heterogeneity at the model and market levels.
We use our estimates to unpack the contributions of tari↵s, trade/FDI costs, home preference,
and taste heterogeneity to home market advantage. To quantify home market advantage, we
calculate the di↵erence in market share when a model is sold at home versus abroad, controlling
for model and market fixed e↵ects. We find that, on average, a model’s home market share is more
than triple its share abroad—albeit from a small base, given that there are more than 200 models
competing in most markets. Using our structural estimates, we then evaluate the contributions
of potential drivers of the home market advantage by computing counterfactual prices and shares
after removing various potential drivers of market segmentation and re-computing the home market
advantage statistic. We find that home market advantage is most sensitive to the removal of home
preference for domestic brands, declining by about 60 percent. In contrast, when we remove all
supply-related frictions, the home market advantage declines by only 13 percent. This finding points
to home preference as a key missing element of the trade and multinational production literatures.
Home preference may arise due to nationalistic feelings among consumers or through the ability
of home brands to provide unobserved characteristics (body styling, interior features such as cup
holders) that better fit their home market. Importantly, our results are obtained controlling for the
impact of a brand’s entry date into a market and dealer density. Since, for historical reasons, these
factors are correlated with home status, treating them as unobserved would lead to even larger
estimates of home preference.
A number of papers have looked at the car industry to study questions in international trade.
Among them, Feenstra (1988), Goldberg (1995), and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999) analyze
4In an alternative approach, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) use plant level production data to recover markups
in a trade setting.
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the e↵ects of Japanese voluntary export restraints on the American auto market. Goldberg and
Verboven (2001b) study price dispersion in the European car market and also find evidence for
consumers favoring national brands. Goldberg and Verboven (2004) use panel data from the car
industry to demonstrate a strong positive e↵ect of the Euro on price convergence. Brambilla (2005)
investigates firms’ responses to trade policy in South America. McCalman and Spearot (2013) study
firms’ o↵shoring strategies using data on North American light truck production locations. More
recently in contemporaneous work, Head and Mayer (2015) estimate a model of international trade
and foreign production using sourcing data from the automotive industry, finding that foreign sales
are impeded significantly by trade, foreign production, and multinational sales frictions. Similar
to our paper, the latter captures a general disadvantage in selling outside the home market. Our
contribution is to disentangle the demand and supply related components of this disadvantage.5
Our findings are related to Atkin (2013) who demonstrates that neglecting taste heterogene-
ity for food leads to biased estimates of gains from trade. They also complement an extensive
literature in marketing illustrating the importance of brand preferences (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and
Dube 2009, Bronnenberg, Dube, and Gentzkow 2012). Relative to these papers, we contribute by
jointly analyzing cost and preference di↵erences across markets and quantifying their impact in an
international context.
The next section describes the data and presents the stylized facts motivating our analysis.
Section 3 formulates a model of international competition in the automobile market. We estimate
the model in Section 4 and evaluate the drivers of home market advantage in Section 5. We conclude
in Section 6.
2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our data set covers the market for passenger cars in 6 EU countries (Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, Great Britain), Brazil, Canada and the US for the period 2007-2011.6 For each
available market-year, we observe model-level sales (i.e. number of new cars sold), prices (MSRP)
5While their dataset reports model level flows between all assembly locations and many more destination markets,
our dataset has more detailed information about the product—most notably, prices and characteristics—in fewer yet
important markets. Having information on prices and quantities separately is key in identifying demand from supply-
related factors.
6Brazilian market data is missing for 2007 and Canadian data is available for 2008-2009 only. Total sales cover
more than 90% of total new passenger car sales in the European markets and 80% of sales in the American markets.
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Table 1: Market concentration
Sales Firms Top 5 Brands Top 5 Models Top 5
BEL 496,165 20 0.68 39 0.44 314 0.13
BRA 2,555,502 17 0.82 23 0.81 98 0.36
CAN 1,137,453 16 0.65 34 0.50 207 0.22
DEU 3,011,972 20 0.71 38 0.54 323 0.18
ESP 1,082,867 21 0.72 39 0.44 290 0.16
FRA 2,045,998 20 0.81 38 0.65 271 0.25
GBR 2,026,497 22 0.63 39 0.47 311 0.21
ITA 2,016,114 22 0.70 41 0.51 283 0.26
USA 10,390,308 19 0.68 40 0.53 291 0.14
Notes: Average number of passenger cars sold annually in each country over
the data period. Market shares by top manufacturing group (firms), brands
and models are revenue-based.
and product characteristics (such as length, width, weight, and fuel e ciency). The characteristics
of a model are the sales-weighted average trim-level characteristics and vary across markets and
years. We also constructed a data set of assembly locations informing us about the countries in
which the models in our demand data were assembled in any given year. We complement this data
set with market-specific variables such as gas prices, import tari↵s on cars, sales taxes, the level
and dispersion of household income as well as brand-market specific variables such as a brand’s
entry date into a market and number of car dealers. Appendix A describes the construction of the
data set.
Some manufacturing groups own multiple brands. In what follows, we distinguish firms (man-
ufacturing groups such as GM and VW), brands (such as Vauxhall and Opel owned by GM, Audi
and Seat owned by VW) and models (such as Vauxhall Corsa and Opel Corsa). In cases where a
firm owns foreign brands, we distinguish the headquarter country from a brand’s nationality. For
example, GM is a US firm, but Vauxhall and Opel are British and German brands, respectively.
In other words, a brand’s nationality is defined as the country from which it historically originates.
Across all years and markets, the data set encompasses 28 firms, 60 brands and 597 models. Firms
are headquartered in 12 di↵erent countries, and brands are associated with 15 di↵erent countries.
Next, we document a number of facts that influence our modeling of the industry. We conclude
the section with a hedonic regression which is informative for our use of instruments later in the
paper.
The oligopolistic nature of the car industry is well known. While measures of concentration
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Table 2: Market shares by brand nationality
Market share of brands from
DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA Other
BEL 0.34 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.23
BRA 0.23 - 0.11 0.00 0.23 0.31 0.12
CAN 0.07 - - 0.01 - 0.34 0.58
DEU 0.55 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.21
ESP 0.26 0.09 0.26 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.22
FRA 0.19 0.02 0.52 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.16
GBR 0.23 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.16 0.25
ITA 0.24 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.30 0.12 0.17
USA 0.08 - - 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.52
Notes: Each row presents the revenue-based market share of brands
originating from countries listed in the columns, adding up to one sub-
ject to rounding error. - means that brands from the origin country are
not sold in the market, and 0.00 implies a market share of less than one
percent. Other includes Japan, Korea, China, India, Sweden, Malaysia,
Czech Republic, Romania and Russia. The bottom panel excludes these
“other” countries and presents market shares within the brand-owning
producers in our dataset.
vary across markets (Table 1), the top 5 firms account for an average of 55% of total revenues
across all market-years. Similarly, the market share of the top 5 brands is 35%.
Table 2 presents market shares by brand nationality. The diagonal in bold highlights the
dominance of home brands (Belgium, Brazil and Canada do not have a national brand in our data
set). Spanish and British brands have marginal sales outside of their markets. Similarly, Italian
brands have low sales in other European markets but a stronger presence in Brazil due to FDI. The
most striking di↵erence is between Germany and France: in both markets, home brands account
for more than half of the sales, whereas German brands’ market share in France is only 19%, which
is relatively higher than the French market share of 9% in Germany.
Brands’ di↵erential market shares across countries are driven by an extensive margin of model
o↵erings as well as an intensive margin of sales per model. In order to decompose these two margins,
we follow Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) and start with the identity
sbmt = s¯bmt ·Nbmt,
where sbmt is the share of brand b in total market m sales in year t, and Nbmt is the number of
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Table 3: Market share decomposition
Variable I II III IV
ln(s¯bmt) ln(Nbmt) ln(s¯bmt) ln(Nbmt)
ln(sbmt) 0.619 0.381 0.578 0.422
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 1471 1471 1471 1471
R2 0.810 0.617 0.781 0.654
Share Units Units Revenue Revenue
Margin Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. This table shows the share of varia-
tion in sbm coming from the intensive margin (average model market share
of the brand) and the extensive margin (number of models o↵ered by the
brand). Accordingly, columns 1 and 2 as well as columns 3 and 4 add up
to one. All regressions are estimated with year fixed e↵ects.
models o↵ered. We then separately project ln(Nbmt) and ln(s¯bmt) on ln(sbmt). Table 3 reports the
results. The intensive margin accounts for 58 to 62 percent of the overall variation, depending on
whether the market share is in revenues or units sold. Variation in the popularity of brands across
countries is not simply due to the number of products o↵ered.
To gauge the extent of the home market advantage, we project market shares on a dummy
variable that takes the value one if a model is at home and zero otherwise. Table 4 presents the
results. First two columns are the brand-market-year (bmt) level, while the last column is at the
model-market-year (jmt) level. Given the importance of the extensive margin documented above,
column II also controls for the (log) number of models that the brand o↵ers. Fixed e↵ects control
for brands’ and models’ global popularity and market-year specific conditions. We find a large and
significant home market e↵ect: being a home brand increases market share at the model-level by
238 percent.7 We label this e↵ect “home market advantage.”
Table 5 presents average prices and characteristics (weighted by sales) of cars sold in each
market. We observe MSRP price in each country. In countries with a retail sales tax, we augment
this price with the retail sales tax so it approximates the e↵ective price to the consumer. The
average car in the North American market is larger in horsepower and size (columns 2 and 3) and
less fuel e cient (column 4) than the typical car sold in Europe and Brazil. Di↵erences in gas
7Following Kennedy (1981) and van Garderen and Shah (2002), we calculate home market advantage using
100 · (exp(cˆ  12V (cˆ))  1), where cˆ is the coe cient on the dummy for being a home brand and V (cˆ) is the estimate
of its variance.
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Table 4: Home market advantage
Variable I II III
ln(sbmt) ln(sbmt) ln(sjmt)
Home brand 1.675 1.066 1.219
(0.082) (0.061) (0.032)
ln(Nbmt) 1.533
(0.042)
Observations 1471 1471 8834
R2 0.794 0.895 0.720
Market-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes
Model FE Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are estimated with market-year (mt) fixed e↵ects. First
two columns are at the brand-market-year (bmt) level
and use brand fixed e↵ects. The last column is at the
model-market-year (jmt) and uses model fixed e↵ects.
prices, however, a↵ect the average cost of a mile (last column) that consumers face in each market.
While some of this variation is due to the extensive margin, characteristics also di↵er within models.
Controlling for model fixed e↵ects, we see less powerful engines and much higher fuel economy in
European countries and Brazil compared to the North American market (see Table B.1 in Appendix
B). These systematic di↵erences highlight the importance of controlling for product characteristics
when estimating consumer demand.
On the production side, there are 50 countries that assemble cars. 43% of the models (255 out
of 598) are assembled in more than one country, accounting for 64% of total revenue. The market
share of models assembled in 5 or more countries is 30% (see figure B.1 in the appendix). While
we do not know the exact sources of supply, we can analyze each market in terms of potential
sources of supply. Column 1 of Table 6 presents the average number of countries in which models
consumed in a particular market are assembled. For instance, there are 3.8 countries in which
models sold in Brazil are assembled (weighted by models’ market shares in Brazil), while models
sold in Canada are assembled in 5 countries. The nearest of these plants is on average 1,885 km
away from Brazilian consumers while models sold in Canada and the US are assembled in more
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Table 5: Prices and characteristics
Price HP/Wt Size MPG Gas price MPD
BEL 32,578 58.4 7.6 34.4 7.3 4.7
BRA 23,801 62.3 6.8 30.1 5.6 5.4
CAN 30,507 91.8 8.3 22.3 2.9 7.6
DEU 35,940 66.8 7.6 29.3 7.3 4
ESP 31,790 60.8 7.6 32.6 5.4 6.1
FRA 29,712 57.2 7.3 35.5 7 5.1
GBR 31,390 65.5 7.5 30.4 7 4.3
ITA 27,654 57.6 7 33.4 7.2 4.7
USA 28,867 97.9 8.7 21 3.1 6.7
Notes: All variables are averages over models weighted by market
share over the data period. Prices are in USD, converted from lo-
cal currency using mean yearly exchange rates and averaged over the
data period. HP/Wt denotes horsepower per weight (kg) times 1,000.
Size is meter length times meter width. MPG is miles per gallon. Gas
prices are per gallon in USD. MPD is miles per dollar (MPG/price).
distant locations (column 2).8 Geography, units costs and trade policy are important determinants
of these potential supply locations. Brazil is the most protected country in our data set, with an
MFN import tari↵ on cars equal to 35%, and the US is the most open, with an MFN import tari↵
of 2.5%.9 (column 4). The resulting tari↵-jumping FDI leads to a higher market share for the
models that are assembled domestically (column 3).
To gain some initial insight into how model characteristics and supply location correlate with
prices, Table 7 presents the results of a reduced form regression of price including model and market-
year fixed e↵ects. While this regression is unable to distinguish demand and supply e↵ects from
each other, it does give an indication of how equilibrium price moves as model features change. As
expected, horsepower per weight, size and fuel e ciency, are all associated with higher prices. The
coe cient on distance to nearest assembly is also positive and significant. Under the assumption
that consumers do not care about distance to assembly after controlling for other factors, this result
implies that assembly distance has some power as an instrument for demand. Most interestingly,
being assembled at home is negatively correlated with price, while being a home brand is positively
8 These figures include internal distance within a country. We use bilateral and internal distances from the
CEPII data (Mayer and Zignago 2011) calculated as population-weighted distances between the biggest cities of two
countries. Internal distances range from 66 km in Belgium to 1,853km in the U.S.
9The so-called US “chicken tax” of 25% applies on light trucks, which we exclude from our analysis. SUVs are
imported as passenger cars.
10
Table 6: Supply locations
Supply Average Domestic MFN
Locations Distance Share (%) Tari↵ (%)
BEL 4.4 1095 9 10
BRA 3.8 1885 87 35
CAN 5 3670 26 6.1
DEU 4.7 1077 51 10
ESP 4.5 1627 33 10
FRA 4.2 1026 41 10
GBR 4.5 1440 17 10
ITA 4 1333 20 10
USA 4.2 3625 54 2.5
Notes: Supply locations is the average number of countries in
which models sold in a market are assembled, weighted by mod-
els’ market share. Average distance is the average distance
across models to the closest supply location, weighted by mod-
els’ market share. Domestic share is the market share of models
which have an assembly plant in the country. Implied internal
distances capture di↵erences in land area across countries. MFN
(most favored nation) is the non-discriminatory tari↵ rate ap-
plied to WTO members that are not in a free trade agreement
with the country.
associated with price. These two features can be separated due to foreign direct investment: some
home brands are produced abroad and imported while some foreign brands are assembled within the
market. This finding supports our assumption in the structural model below that brand nationality
a↵ects the demand for cars, while cars’ assembly location a↵ects their production costs.
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Table 7: Price regression
ln(pricejmt)
ln(hppwtjmt) 0.258
(0.0107)
ln(sizejmt) 0.538
(0.039)
ln(mpdjmt) 0.0194
(0.0096)
ln(distjmt) 0.0192
(0.0016)
Domestic assembly -0.0158
(0.0035)
Home brand 0.0192
(0.0033)
Observations 8835
R2 0.985
Market-year FE Yes
Model FE Yes
Notes: See table 5 for the description of
parameters. Home brand is one if a model
belongs to a national brand and zero oth-
erwise. Domestic assembly is one if there is
an assembly plant for a model in the coun-
try and zero otherwise. Regression controls
for market-year and model fixed e↵ects.
3 Model
We model the national market for cars in a given calendar year. We first give a brief overview
of the model describing the assumptions on the timing of actions. We then discuss demand and
supply in more detail using notation in the subsections below.
Manufacturers are endowed with a set of models (i.e., Toyota Corolla, Toyota Camry, etc.) to
sell within the market. Each model is endowed with a set of characteristics (e.g., size, fuel e ciency)
and a set of assembly locations where the model can be produced. At the start of the year, all
manufacturers observe a set of demand and supply shocks for each model that are uncorrelated
with model or assembly location characteristics. This assumption implies that a manufacturer
chooses to o↵er a car in a location before observing the model-market demand or supply shock.
This assumption—which is common to many random coe cients demand estimations (e.g., Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995)—is reasonable in our context because while it is relatively easy to
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adjust a car’s price in reaction to local market conditions, the decision to release a model in a
country generally involves a significant design period prior to entry. Similarly, moving the assembly
of a certain model to a plant requires a planning and retooling time. Having observed their own and
competitors’ demand and supply shocks, manufacturers simultaneously choose prices at the model
level according to a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. We follow the literature on automobile pricing in
assuming that prices are set at the model level and consumers face a single price. Consumers then
observe these prices and make purchases. Finally, automakers select the assembly location from
which to source ordered cars. We allow for heterogeneity in production costs at the car-assembly
location level so that a manufacturer may choose to source cars from multiple assembly locations
to supply the same model to a market.
3.1 Demand
The utility to consumer i in market m from purchasing model j is,10
ujmi = u¯(xjm, pjm, mi,↵mi) + ⇠jm + "jmi (1)
where xjm represents the model characteristics—e.g. horsepower per weight, size, fuel e ciency,
or brand fixed e↵ects—and pjm represents the price. The terms  mi and ↵mi represent tastes
for characteristics and price sensitivity, respectively. Di↵erences in  mi across individuals and
countries may arise due to innate preferences or di↵erences in the prices of complimentary goods
such as parking space and gasoline.
Individual tastes are distributed according to a market-specific distribution ( mi,↵mi) ⇠ Fm( · |✓d),
where ✓d is a vector of parameters. Each model receives a market-year specific demand shock, ⇠jm,
that is common to all consumers within a market. Finally, each consumer receives an idiosyncratic
utility shock for each model, "jmi, which is distributed according to the Type-I extreme value
distribution.
Consumers in each market observe the set of available products and choose the model that
maximizes their utility from all available models and a no-purchase option. We normalize the
utility of the no-purchase option to u0mi = "0mi. Let Cm be the set of cars consumers can choose
10For readability we omit the time subscript, t, from the model section.
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from within market m. Each consumer chooses the option that maximizes her utility,
dmi = argmax
j2Cm[0
ujmi.
Integrating out the idiosyncratic consumer taste shock, we have the probability that each consumer
buys a car given their tastes ( mi,↵mi),
Pr(dmi = j| mi,↵mi) = e
u¯jmi+⇠jm
1 +
P
k2Cm e
u¯kmi+⇠km
.
Market shares for model j can be calculated by integrating these individual-specific probabilities
over the distribution of consumer tastes in the market.
sjm =
Z
Pr(dmi = j| mi,↵mi)dFm( mi,↵mi|✓d). (2)
The demand parameters, ✓d, govern the distribution of tastes. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995), we will estimate these parameters by inverting the share equation to recover ⇠jm and
constructing a set of moment conditions using exogeneity restrictions.
3.2 Supply
Manufacturers supply models to consumers by sourcing them from available assembly locations,
which were determined prior to demand and cost shocks being revealed to the firms. The cost of
sourcing a car i of model type j for market m from location ` is,
cjm`i = c1(hjm,)c2(gjm`,  )e
!jm ⌫jm`i (3)
where c1(·) represents model- and market-specific costs of selling model j in market m, which
are determined by a vector of observable model and market characteristics hjm (such as global
production costs of the vehicle and local distribution costs) and a vector of parameters . Similarly,
c2(·) represents the e↵ect of costs due to sourcing model j from an assembly plant in location `
to be sold in market m. It depends on a vector of known market-assembly-model characteristics
gjm` (such as distance to the sourcing country from the market and firm’s headquarter location
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and productivity in the assembly location) and a vector of parameters  . The structural error term
!jm represents a shock to the marginal costs of selling model j in a given market m. Finally, costs
at the car level are a↵ected by an idiosyncratic shock, ⌫jm`i. This final cost is revealed to the
manufacturer at the time a car is ordered, but after prices for models are set. Producers have full
knowledge of !jm and all other cost shifters besides ⌫jm`i when setting prices. As we show below,
the idiosyncratic error ⌫jm`i introduces the possibility of “gains from diversification” in assembly
locations and rationalizes the possibility that some models are sourced from multiple assembly
locations.
Given this model for costs, the manufacturer minimizes costs by sourcing cars from the lowest
cost location from its set of available assembly locations, Lj ,
cjmi = min
`2Lj
cjm`i.
However, the firm must set prices prior to the ⌫jm`i shock being revealed; therefore it must set
prices according to its expected cost of supplying a model by integrating over ⌫jm`i. We assume
⌫jm`i is distributed Type-I extreme value with scale parameter  ⌫ .11 Given this assumption, the
probability of sourcing a car from location ` is,
Pr(i is sourced from `) =
exp
⇣  log c2(gjm`, )
 ⌫
⌘
P
k2L(j) exp
⇣  log c2(gjmk, )
 ⌫
⌘
=
c2(gjm`,  ) 1/ ⌫P
k2L(j) c2(gjmk,  ) 1/ ⌫
, (4)
where we exploit the fact that minimizing cost is equivalent to maximizing the negative of the
logarithm of cost. Therefore, the logarithm of the average marginal cost to sell a car of model j
is,12
11We could relax the assumption that ⌫jm`i is independent across i at the cost of additional notation. For example,
we could divide the year into an large number of discrete time sub-periods and let each consumer who purchases a car
within a sub-period receive the same draw of ⌫jm`i. This would be consistent with the shock reflecting unanticipated
backlogs or shocks to assembly location productivity during the year.
12A constant from integrating the Type-1 extreme value distribution is absorbed in log c1(hjm,).
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log cjm = log c1(hjm,)   ⌫ log
0@ X
k2L(j)
exp
✓  log c2(gjmk,  )
 ⌫
◆1A+ !jm. (5)
Or equivalently, the average marginal cost is,
cjm = c1(hjm,)
0@ X
k2L(j)
c2(gjmk,  )
 1/ ⌫
1A  ⌫ exp(!jm). (6)
In these expressions, the second term captures the fact that manufacturers endogenously choose
to source cars from the lowest cost locations. The intuition behind this formula is straightforward.
Lower cost locations are more likely to be used as sources, which is reflected in the fact that they
contribute the most to the sum over locations. Moreover, as more locations are added, this sum
increases, further reducing costs. The value of  ⌫ captures “gains from variety” in the sense that
the value of an additional assembly location is scaled by  ⌫ . Furthermore, as  ⌫ ! 0, firms always
source from the single location that has the lowest average cost and (5) becomes,
lim
 ⌫!0
log cjm = log c1(hjm,) + min
k2L(j)
⇢
log c2(gjmk,  )
 
+ !jm.
So as  ⌫ ! 0, only variation in gjmk at the minimum cost location a↵ects the marginal cost of a
model. The supply side parameters to estimate are ✓s = ( ,, ⌫).
3.3 Pricing Equilibrium
Firms choose prices to maximize profits given demand and the average marginal cost of a model
cjmt, which is determined by the cost minimization across available assembly locations. Since a
mass of consumers purchase cars, cjmt is exactly known to manufacturers when they set prices, even
though they do not know ⌫jm`i until consumer i purchases a car. For the same reason, firms know
from (2) exactly what the shares will be given a vector of prices within the market pm. Therefore,
firm f ’s profit maximization problem is to choose prices for its portfolio of models within a market
Jfm to maximize profits,13
13We control for di↵erences in tax regime across markets using country market dummies in the specification of
costs. The model could be explicitly extended to account for di↵ering tax regimes (e.g., value added versus retail
sales tax) given stronger assumptions how the base for these regimes is determined.
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max
{pjm}
j2Jfm
X
j2Jfm
⇥
pjm   cjm
⇤ ·Nm · sjm(pjm; p jm ), (7)
where Nm is the exogenous number of potential buyers and p
 j
m is the vector of prices for models
other than j. A Nash-Bertrand equilibrium strategy profile is a vector pm such that sjm = sjm(pm)
and all firms are maximizing profits. Therefore, prices satisfy the system of first order conditions
for every price, pjm,
sjm(pm) +
X
k2Jm(f)
⇥
pkm   ckm
⇤@skm(pm)
@pjm
= 0. (8)
3.4 Identification
The demand parameters are identified via moment condition assumptions on the model-market
demand shocks ⇠jm. As shown by Berry (1994), there is a one-to-one mapping between the demand
shocks and observed market shares given demand parameters and observed prices. So, given a
demand parameter ✓d, we can numerically recover the complete vector of demand shocks within a
market,
⇠m = s
 1(sm, pm; ✓d).
We then identify the model using a vector of instruments zjm such that E[⇠jmzjm] = 0. The model
precludes price from being used as an instrument since it is endogenously determined. We use
three types of instruments. First, model characteristics (e.g., xmj)—which are determined before
demand shocks are realized—are uncorrelated with demand shocks, though they will clearly be
correlated with price. Second, as discussed in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), characteristics
of other models are similarly available as instruments, since they a↵ect prices though the markup
term in (8).14 Finally, functions of observed variables that a↵ect costs (hjm, gjm`) may be used
as instruments since they are uncorrelated with the demand shock ⇠jm but a↵ect prices through
the costs in (8). In our case, these variables are the drivers of trade costs, such as the distance to
assembly locations. We have experimented with all three types of instruments, and use all three in
14These instruments have been recently been criticized by Armstrong (2014) relating to the viability of markup
instruments when there are a large number of firms. These predictions are corroborated by Monte Carlo simulations
performed by Conlon (2013).
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our preferred specification.
With the demand parameters identified, we are able to recover marginal cost for each model
by inverting the firms’ first order conditions at observed prices and shares as in Nevo (2001). For
clarity, we suppress the market subscripts and focus on a single market. Given demand parameters
and observed prices and shares, all the terms in (8) are known with the exception of cj . Note
that firms internalize their cross-price e↵ect on other models that they sell, but not on competitor
models. If we define ⌦ such that,
⌦jk =  @sk(p)@pj · 1[j, k jointly owned],
then we can write (8) in vector notation, s(p) ⌦(p c) = 0, and can easily solve this for the vector
of marginal costs,
c = [p  ⌦ 1s(p)].
Once costs are recovered, we can identify the cost side parameter ✓s from (5) and the assump-
tion that E[!jm|(hjm, gjm`)] = 0. While identification of model- and market-specific costs, , is
straightforward given regularity conditions that will be satisfied by our parameterization, the con-
tribution of trade- and location-specific production costs, parameterized by   and  ⌫ , are more
subtle.15 First, consider identification of  ⌫ , the variance of the idiosyncratic car cost shock. Sup-
pose that all assembly locations were identical and geography was symmetric, that is for a given
model, c2(gjm`,  ) = c¯2. In this case, the only reason to source from a particular location would
be due to the extreme value error, ⌫jm`i. There would be a cost advantage to operating multiple
assembly locations in that you would get a new draw of this idiosyncratic cost shock for each loca-
tion. Therefore, the extent to which marginal costs decline as we vary the number of production
locations identifies  ⌫ . In the extreme, suppose  ⌫ = 0. Then, an additional assembly location will
not reduce marginal costs at all. With  ⌫ identified, we can identify the parameters on assembly
location characteristics from the variation in these characteristics. This variation will a↵ect average
costs in two ways. First, it will change the cost associated with that assembly location conditional
on it being used, and second, it will change the probability that the plant is used to source cars.
15We are assuming a location normalization in c2(gjmk,  ), as is common in discrete choice models, without loss
of generality. A scale normalization on  ⌫ is not necessary as we explain below.
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Again, consider the extreme case when  ⌫ = 0. Then, only variation in the lowest-cost assembly
location’s characteristics a↵ect average costs. Therefore, variation in an assembly characteristic
across locations first identifies which is the lowest cost and then identifies the parameter for that
characteristic based on the size of the change in costs. If  ⌫ is positive, then variation in character-
istics of all assembly locations a↵ect costs, but its impact is weighted by the quantity of cars each
location provides. In summary, each element of   is identified as long as it a↵ects c2(gjm`,  ) for
some model j where trade flows are positive between market m and assembly location `. This is
the case even though we do not directly observe trade flows because we can use variation in model
costs, cjm, and gjm` to infer the e↵ect of  .
4 Estimation
The model is estimated in two stages. We first estimate the demand side. We then use firms’ profit
maximization conditions and the estimated demand parameters to recover the marginal cost of
supplying each model to each country. Finally, we use these recovered costs to estimate the supply
side.16 Since we use data from multiple years, we introduce a time subscript, t, below.
4.1 Demand Parameterization and Estimation
We start by parameterizing the utility function to be quasi-linear in price, and quadratic in tastes
for characteristics:
u¯(xjmt, pjmt, mi,↵mti) =  
hp
mi hppwtjmt +  
hp2
m hppwt
2
jmt (9)
+  szmi sizejmt +  
sz2
m size
2
jmt
+  mdmi mpdjmt +  
md2
m mpd
2
jmt
  ↵mti pjmt + ◆t +  mb(j),
where hppwtjmt is the horsepower of the car divided by its weight (a measure of acceleration
capability), sizejmt is the size of the car (length times width in meters), and mpdjmt is miles per
dollar at market price for gas (according to city fuel e ciency rating). This specification allows for
16In principle, demand and supply can be estimated jointly, which would improve e ciency at the cost of compu-
tational tractability.
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consumers’ marginal taste for a characteristic to be increasing or decreasing in the amount of the
characteristic provided. For example, we would expect the marginal utility of size to decrease as
a car gets larger. We further assume that linear tastes are normally distributed around a market-
specific mean with common variance across markets,17
266664
 hpmi
 szmi
 mdmi
377775 ⇠ N
0BBBB@
266664
 ¯hpm
 ¯szm
 ¯mdm
377775 ,
266664
 2hp 0 0
0  2sz 0
0 0  2md
377775
1CCCCA ,
while the quadratic parameters are market-specific but are constant across consumers within a
market. This specification leads to the intuitive interpretation that a model with sizejmt provides
a marginal utility for size to the median consumer within market m as given by
med
✓
@ujmti
@sizejmt
◆
=  ¯szm + 2 
sz2
m sizejmt,
while other consumers’ marginal utility for size is normally distributed around this level with
variance  2sz.
Consumers’ price-sensitivity, ↵mti, is distributed log-normally conditional on consumer i’s in-
come according to,
log↵mti ⇠ N(↵¯+ ⇡↵ log incmti, 2↵).
Letting price sensitivity vary with income allows for non-homotheticity of preferences. Because we
do not observe individual consumers, we simulate their income, incmti, from a log normal distribu-
tion fitted to mean household income and the Gini ratio for each market.
The final two terms in (9) are time and brand-country fixed e↵ects. Time fixed e↵ects capture
global shocks to automobile demand. The brand-country fixed e↵ect,  mb(j), captures revealed
preference for di↵erent brands within each country.18 For each model j, b(j) represents its brand.
The same firm may operate multiple brands. That is, the Toyota Corolla is of brand ‘Toyota’ while
17In principle we could allow the variances to vary by market, however because they enter the objective function
in a nonlinear way, doing so would greatly increase the computational complexity of estimation. Moreover, since we
have only 4-5 years of data from each market it is unclear that these parameters could be precisely estimated at the
market level.
18As a robustness check, we have also estimated a version of the model with model fixed e↵ects that are constant
across countries.
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the Lexus RX 450 is of brand ‘Lexus’ even though they are o↵ered by the same firm (Toyota).
Separating brands within firms is important since firms frequently use branding as a method of
accentuating vertical di↵erentiation. To the extent that consumers exhibit a preference for their
home brands, this preference is absorbed into these brand-country fixed e↵ects.
Under this parameterization of the demand model, ✓d = ( ¯xm, 
x2
m , x, ↵¯,⇡↵, ↵, ◆t, mb) repre-
sents the parameters to estimate, where x 2 {hp, sz,md}. As discussed above, given ✓d and the
observed market shares, there is a one-to-one mapping to the vector of demand shocks ⇠(✓d). We
approximate the market shares using Halton sequences to integrate out the distribution of con-
sumers taste, and solve this mapping numerically to recover the demand shocks implied by the
data for a given parameter values. We estimate the model by minimizing the generalized method
of moments objective function,
✓ˆd = argmin
✓d
⇠(✓d)0ZWˆZ 0⇠(✓d),
where Z is a matrix of instruments and Wˆ is a consistent estimate of the optimal weight matrix
obtained from a first stage estimate. This estimator is asymptotically normal with variance covari-
ance matrix provided in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2000). For the instrument
set, we use characteristics of competing models, a dummy for whether the model has a domestic as-
sembly location, the tari↵ rate of the closest assembly location, the number of production locations
interacted with a market dummy, and the minimum distance to an assembly location interacted
with a market dummy.19
4.2 Demand Estimates
The demand estimates are presented in Table 8. Estimates of the tastes for characteristics are
listed by country across columns at the top of table, with estimates of the standard deviation of
the linear coe cients in the final column. Estimates of price sensitivity are provided at the bottom
of the table. The price sensitivity parameters are all strongly significant and indicate that price
sensitivity is decreasing in income (⇡↵ < 0) with substantial dispersion conditional on income ( ↵).
This finding is consistent with Fieler (2011) who also estimated non-homotheticity in a general
19Results are robust to alternative specifications of the instruments.
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Table 9: Home preference estimates
Variable I II III IV
Home Preference, ⇢ 1.136 1.013 0.804 0.745
(0.092) (0.094) (0.096) (0.082)
Years in Market 0.005 0.003
(0.002) (0.001)
Dealer Density 0.178 0.169
(0.024) (0.014)
Notes: Home preference assumed to be homogeneous across coun-
tries. Weighted bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
equilibrium trade model using aggregate data.
Considering taste for size, all countries have a positive linear and a negative quadratic coe cient
(implying decreasing marginal utility) that are significant for seven out of nine countries. At the
median size, consumers have positive marginal utility for size in all countries. Taste for horsepower
is typically positive and appears close to linear, although it is statistically insignificant. Taste
for miles per dollar is most heterogeneous across countries: consumers from the United States
seem to value miles per dollar much less than French and German consumers. Some countries’
median consumer has a distaste for miles per dollar, which may arise due to collinearity with
other characteristics. Looking across countries and characteristics, Canada, Italy and the United
States are remarkably similar in their tastes, while there are substantial di↵erences between other
countries. The random coe cients for non-price characteristics are insignificant and smaller in
magnitude, suggesting that within market taste heterogeneity is largely captured either through
price sensitivities or in mean di↵erences across countries.
Consumers may also have an innate preference for purchasing local brands. For example, one
might expect that Germans prefer Volkswagen because they view it as a German brand, while
Italians might derive extra utility from purchasing a Fiat. The brand country dummy estimates,b mb, capture revealed tastes for particular brands within country m. These will include whether
or not a brand is considered a “home brand” by consumers, as well as the unobserved quality of
the brand (such as reliability), its marketing cachet, the availability of dealerships and repair shops
for the brand, et cetera. To assess the strength of home preference in brands, we project the brand
market fixed e↵ects on whether or not a brand is domestic, a series of brand-market level controls,
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as well as brand and market fixed e↵ects. Specifically, we follow Chamberlain (1982) and Nevo
(2001) to estimate,
b mb = ⇢1[b is a domestic brand in m] +  wmb + ⌘b + µm + umb, (10)
where ⇢ represents the home market preference. Brand fixed e↵ects control for the overall quality
of the brand, while the controls, wmb, account for brand market characteristics which are likely
to be correlated with home status. We include a measure of brand history in a market —the
number of years the brand has been operating in the country prior to the start of our data—and
a measure of convenience for the consumer—the number of dealerships per capita that sell the
brands’ products.20 We refer to the parameter of interest, ⇢, as home preference; it is the revealed
preference for buying home brands, after controlling for characteristics of o↵erings, overall brand
quality, and the brand history and dealer network in a market. This preference may have several
sources, including: the ability of home brands to provide unobserved characteristics that better fit
their home market, consumers’ nationalistic feelings for domestic brands, or consumers’ stronger
familiarity with domestic brands.
Table 9 presents our estimates of the drivers of brand preference varying the set of controls.
Across all specifications, the home preference estimate is substantial and highly significant. The
impact of history and dealer density attenuates the estimate of home preference by up to 35 percent,
suggesting that the head start of national brands plays an important role in their dominance.21 For
our preferred specification with both controls in column IV, the median consumer’s willingness to
pay for a domestic brand ranges from about $800 US (in Spain) to about $1,050 US (in Germany).
To investigate how home preference varies across countries, we also estimate the model allowing
⇢ and   to be interacted with market country. The results, presented in Table 10, show that the
home preference is not driven by outlier countries. Because most countries have relatively few home
brands, these estimates are less precise, although most estimates remain statistically significant.
However, there is some heterogeneity in home preference across countries. We find that home
preference is highest in Spain, France, and Italy. The countries with the smallest home preferences
20While the number of dealerships changes slightly from year to year, it is highly persistent so we fix it over our
time in our data and rely on cross-brand variation. See the data Appendix A for details.
21This result is robust to alternative specification of market-brand characteristics, such as rank of entry (rather
than years in market) and including controls in logarithms (as opposed to levels).
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Table 10: Country-specific home preference
estimates
I II
DEU 0.812 0.212
(0.193) (0.286)
ESP 1.489 1.350
(0.697) (0.704)
FRA 1.533 1.296
(0.211) (0.262)
GBR 1.455 0.978
(0.224) (0.216)
ITA 1.712 1.094
(0.304) (0.303)
USA 0.645 0.177
(0.159) (0.199)
Brand controls No Yes
Notes: Home preference and controls (for column
II) are heterogeneous across countries. Weighted
bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Table 11: Median own and cross-price elasticities for select models
Audi A6 Ford Focus Mercedes E350 Renault Clio Toyota Corolla
Audi A6 -6.475 0.017 0.124 0.002 0.010
Ford Focus 0.036 -10.756 0.020 0.232 0.323
Mercedes E 350 0.065 0.004 -6.035 0.002 0.001
Renault Clio 0.004 0.280 0.001 -11.346 0.032
Toyota Corolla 0.002 0.380 0.001 0.270 -11.478
Notes: This table shows the substitution elasticity of models in the row with respect to the prices of mod-
els in the column. Each entry represents the median of elasticities across country-years.
are Germany and the United States. These results are consistent with the findings of Goldberg
and Verboven (2001a) who find a strong preference for domestic brands in European car markets
between 1980-1993.
4.3 Elasticities and Markups
The demand parameters directly imply elasticities and markups for each model. In Table 11 we
present the elasticities and cross-elasticities for selected models in the subset of markets where
these models compete. Looking at the own-price elasticities, we see they vary in an intuitive way.
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Table 12: Median markups of select models across years (percent)
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Audi A4 13.3 17.4 17.4 20.6 21.2 23.0 19.7 21.8 16.1
Audi A6 20.4 21.6 22.6 23.2 25.7 20.8 23.6 23.1
BMW 530 21.3 19.7 23.2 25.7 21.6 23.5 22.4
BMW X3 18.5 17.6 18.0 20.3 23.6 20.0 21.2 20.0
Chrysler 300 16.0 16.0 15.1 17.1 20.6 16.6 17.0 16.4
Ford Fiesta 9.1 7.9 12.5 13.0 11.8 12.0 11.6 10.8
Ford Focus 11.5 8.8 9.8 10.7 12.7 12.8 12.5 13.6 10.0
Honda Accord 11.9 13.9 11.5 16.2 17.4 15.0 15.7 12.8
Honda CR-V 14.3 11.7 14.9 11.8 16.1 17.7 14.7 16.2 12.2
Jaguar XF 19.1 21.0 16.5 21.5 22.9 21.1 19.8 23.9
Jeep Grand Cherokee 17.4 18.8 15.8 18.8 21.3 17.4 18.2 18.4
Lexus RX 450 21.8 24.0 19.0 24.5 25.9 21.0 21.6 24.8
Mercedes E 350 21.4 21.5 20.3 23.0 24.9 20.4 21.8 23.9
Mini New Mini 13.3 8.6 10.4 10.8 12.3 12.7 10.6 13.9 9.3
Renault Clio 7.8 8.8 12.4 14.0 15.8 11.3 11.2
Toyota Corolla 12.0 8.3 11.6 10.8 12.1 11.3 8.7 10.4 11.1
Toyota RAV-4 13.8 12.1 13.3 11.9 15.6 17.0 14.6 16.1 12.4
VW Golf 11.9 11.5 9.5 17.1 17.0 15.4 14.3 16.2 10.1
VW Passat 13.4 14.6 13.1 19.7 19.4 19.8 16.1 20.3 13.6
VW Tiguan 13.3 15.5 13.4 19.0 20.4 20.5 17.9 20.4 13.0
The luxury models are are the least elastic while the three compact-to-midrange models are more
elastic. The Toyota Corolla, which is never a home-brand in our market, has the highest median
own-price elasticity. When we consider the cross-elasticities, the table illustrates that the model
is able to capture the expected competitive patterns. The two luxury models, the Audi A6 and
Mercedes E350, compete most strongly with each other, although the cross elasticities in the luxury
class are generally smaller than for more quotidian models, suggesting that price competition is
less fierce in in the luxury portion of the market. Similarly, Renault Clio, Toyota Corolla, and Ford
Focus compete strongly with each other but not with the luxury vehicles.
Our estimates of elasticities directly predict markups according to the firm’s first order condition
(8). Table 12 presents the median (across years) of the implied markups for a selection of models
in all countries where those models appear. Intuitively, markups are lowest in Brazil, which is by
far the lowest income country in our data set. The highest markups tend to be found in France,
with Spain and Italy close behind. Looking across brands, luxury cars, such as the BMW 530 and
Mercedes E 350, tend to have the highest markups. Several smaller model such as the VW Golf,
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Table 13: Weighted average markups of manufacturers across markets (percent)
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Fiat 10.8 8.6 11.8 10.7 12.4 10.9 16.8 8.7
Ford 9.5 9.7 13.1 11.9 11.6 12.9 12.8 12.6 13.3
GM 10.4 9.5 13.6 12.1 12.0 12.8 12.6 12.6 15.4
PSA 10.2 10.6 11.7 13.1 18.4 11.5 12.6
Toyota 12.3 9.7 13.0 11.7 12.1 13.6 11.9 11.9 14.0
VW 10.7 12.9 12.6 18.6 15.5 16.6 15.3 16.6 14.0
Mini, and Ford Fiesta tend to have smaller markups in the United States than they do in European
countries. SUVs such as the VW Tiguan command high markups in Europe and lower markups in
the United States and Canada, where they face significantly more competition. Overall, the model
produces intuitive estimates of markups—and hence marginal costs—across countries and models.
To illustrate di↵erences between markups for domestic and foreign products, Table 13 presents
weighted average markups aggregated to the firm-country level. Across the table, we see that firms
tend to charge their highest markups in their home countries. Volkswagen in Germany, Ford and
General Motors in the United States, and most strikingly PSA (Peugeot Citroen) in France and
Fiat in Italy. The pattern of home country markups relative to markups of the same firm in other
countries is consistent with demand drivers playing an important role for home market advantage.
4.4 Supply Parameterization and Estimation
In the second stage of our estimation procedure, we use the costs implied by the demand model to
estimate the supply side using nonlinear least squares. To do so, we parameterize c1(hjmt,) and
c2(gjm`t,  ), which determine the costs associated with selling model j in market m and the costs
associated with sourcing model j from assembly location `, respectively.
For country-model-specific costs, we assume,
log c1(hjmt,) = 
hp log hpjmt + 
wt log wtjmt + 
sz log sizejmt (11)
+ mg logmpgjmt + 
mt + j .
As opposed to the demand side, we allow costs to be determined by horsepower and weight sepa-
rately, rather than by their ratio. This is intuitive because we would expect both to increase the
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cost of a car, whereas on the demand side we were using their ratio as a measure of acceleration
while accounting for size separately. We also include miles per gallon (mpg)—rather than miles per
dollar—on the cost side. This is because the price of gas in m should a↵ect demand for fuel-e cient
vehicles, but not the cost of producing fuel-e cient vehicles. Finally, the supply side includes mar-
ket country, time and model fixed e↵ects. In contrast, the demand side includes brand-country
e↵ects. We prefer this specification because it allows us to control for the substantial variation in
unobserved costs of models within brands on the supply side while being flexible about how tastes
for brands vary across countries on the demand side.22 Even when we include a set of model fixed
e↵ects on the supply side, the e↵ect of characteristics on cost are still identified due to variation in
the characteristics of a model both across countries and across years.
The final element of the supply side is the assembly location specific cost function c2(gjm`t,  ),
log c2(gjm`t,  ) = 
mdist log distm` +  
dom1[` = m] +  ctg1[` is contiguous to m] (12)
+ log(1 +  trf · tari↵m`t) +  hqdist log disth(j)` +  xr log fxrate`t +  `.
The first three terms capture the e↵ect of trade costs, including a direct e↵ect of distance as well
as dummies to control for domestic and contiguous trade, in a traditional iceberg-like fashion.23
The parameter  trf captures the proportion of the model’s cost subject to import tari↵s.24
Import tari↵s are ad valorem based on the reported port cost of the car, which is likely to be lower
than the marginal cost of the car implied by profit maximization, since the latter includes internal
shipment and marketing costs. Below, we estimate the model both holding  trf fixed at one (the
case where tari↵s are paid on the full marginal cost) and allowing it to be estimated.
The next term,  hqdist log disth(j)`, accounts for the impact of distance between a firm’s head-
quarters and the assembly location. Costs may be larger for distant plants due to monitoring or
communication costs between a headquarters and its plants, or due to shipment of intermediate
22We have also estimated several alternative specifications, including model fixed e↵ects on both demand and
supply sides and country-brand e↵ects on both sides. The results are qualitatively similar.
23Recall that we use internal distance when the assembly and market countries are the same (m = `), see footnote
8 in Section 2 for details.
24While identification comes mainly from the cross-section, there is also time variation in tari↵s due to several
types of events during the data period: some assembly countries become a member to the World Trade Organization
(Ukraine’s entry in 2008), the EU and US reclassify countries in their Generalized System of Preferences and finally
free trade agreements come into force (EU-Korea FTA in 2011).
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inputs.25 The second to last term,  xr log fxrate`t captures the e↵ect of exchange rate variation in
source locations to costs. fxrate`t is local currency per USD, normalized to one for the base year
2007. A depreciation of assembly country currencies would decrease dollar costs if  xr < 0. Finally,
we control for productivity di↵erences across assembly locations with a location fixed e↵ect,  `, that
is common to all plants within a country. This term absorbs both productivity di↵erence across
assembly countries and measurement error of internal distances within the assembly country.
The vector of supply parameters to estimate is ✓s = (,  , , ⌫). The estimator for the supply
side is the minimizer of the nonlinear least squares objective function,
✓ˆs = argmin
✓s
MX
m=1
TmX
t=1
JmtX
j=1
!jmt(✓
s)2,
where,
!jmt(✓
s) = log cˆjmt   log c1(hjmt,) +  ⌫ log
0@ X
k2Lt(j)
exp
✓  log c2(gjmkt,  )
 ⌫
◆1A .
To account for the fact that marginal costs cˆjmt are functions of demand estimates, standard errors
are calculated using a weighted bootstrap.
In practice, we find that the objective function is minimized at low values of  ˆ⌫ , indicating
that the gains to variety are very small. For such values of  ⌫ , the probability of sourcing from
any particular location converges to either one or zero depending on whether that location is the
minimum cost supplier or not. At low values of  ⌫ , model predictions about marginal costs become
insensitive to variation in  ⌫ . As a result, the objective function becomes almost flat in this region,
although other parameters are precisely estimated. Therefore, we fix  ¯⌫ = 0.01 and estimate the
remaining parameters of the model.26 A low estimate of  ⌫ is consistent with the findings of Head
and Mayer (2015), who report that at the model level, firms almost always source a specific market
from a single origin country.
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Table 14: Cost estimates
Variable I II III IV
Horsepower, hp 0.277 0.277 0.299 0.299
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Weight, wt 0.172 0.171 0.174 0.173
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Size, sz 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.332
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Miles per Gallon, mg 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Assembly to Market Distance,  mdist -0.002 -0.002 0.015 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Domestic Location,  dom -0.019 -0.020 -0.003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Contiguous Location,  ctg -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Assembly to HQ Distance,  hqdist 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Tari↵, ⇣ 0.697 0.697
(0.076) (0.075)
FX rate,  xr -0.010 -0.017
(0.015) (0.015)
Fixed  ⌫ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Car cost, distance measures, tari↵, and car characteristics are in logarithm. Weighted
bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
4.5 Supply Estimates
The estimates of the supply side are presented in Table 14. Considering the e↵ect of characteristics
on the cost side (top panel), horsepower, size, weight and fuel e ciency all have the expected sign
and are statistically significant. Turning to sourcing related costs (bottom panel), we find that
for our preferred specification (column IV), production at a domestic ( dom) or contiguous-country
( ctg) plant decreases costs. The cost elasticity of distance,  midst, is comparable the estimate
of Head and Mayer (2014) (0.036) and within the range of estimates summarized by Head and
Mayer (2013). It is slightly lower than the estimate from the reduced form price regression in Table
7, which could be interpreted as a cost elasticity under the assumption of perfect competition
where firms always source from the nearest location. Assembly-to-HQ distances ( hqdist) increase
25See Giroud (2013) and Tintelnot (2014) for a discussion and evidence for such frictions.
26The estimates and counterfactual results are robust to fixing  ⌫ within a range of [0.001,0.2]. Moreover, an
LR-type test rejects  ⌫ > 0.2 at the 95% confidence level.
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marginal costs, suggesting that there are non-trivial monitoring and management costs related to
remote production. This e↵ect is smaller than the assembly to market cost elasticity and is not
statistically significant.
We also find, however, that properly controlling for tari↵s matter for the magnitude of these
e↵ects. In Columns I-II, the tari↵ incidence parameter,  trf , is fixed at one—so the tari↵ applies
to the full marginal cost of the car—and in Columns III-IV, we allow  trf to be estimated. When
estimating  trf , we find that it is significantly below one, implying that the tari↵ is applied to
less than the full marginal cost of the car, consistent with the presence of a portion of marginal
costs being to do destination-specific internal delivery and marketing. Estimating  trf also has a
substantial e↵ect on the estimates of trade costs. In particular, the cost of assembly-to-market
distance ( mdist) has the expected sign and statistical significance only when tari↵s are controlled
for (from column II to III). In reverse, the benefits of being domestic and contiguous both decrease
and lose significance. This is intuitive because tari↵ rates are positively correlated with distance.
Tari↵s are naturally zero when the assembly plant is domestic and tend to be low between contiguous
countries due to regional trade agreements. As a consequence, fixing the tari↵ incidence parameter
above its estimated value induces downward bias on the impact of distance and an upward bias
on the benefits of domesticity and contiguity. The exchange rate parameter  xr in columns II and
IV is negative as expected, though small in magnitude (a 10 percent depreciation of the assembly
country currency would decrease total production costs – which includes costs incurred in the
assembly, market, and possibly other supplier countries – by about .17 percent). From column III
to IV, its inclusion does not significantly alter other estimates.
Our model delivers implied trade flows between countries at the model level through (3) and
(4). We use this to conduct an out-of-sample test of our cost estimates by investigating how well
they match aggregate trade flows. Specifically, we aggregate model-level flows up to the country-
pair level and compare them to trade flows reported in the WITS database of the World Bank.27
Figure 1 presents the scatter plot comparing our implied trade flows (in logs) with those in the
trade data together with the best linear predictor of the data given our model flows. If our model
27This data is trade flows reported by importers in HS6 product categories associated with assembled cars. These
HS product codes are: 870321, 870322, 870323, 870324, 870331, 870332, 870333, and 870390. This data includes
many small flows due to personal imports of automobiles, so we exclude pairs with less than $5 million in reported
flows, which amounts to roughly 200 units, the reported results are robust to adjusting this cuto↵.
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perfectly replicated the aggregate data, the estimated slope of this regression would be exactly one,
and R2 would be one. In fact, the regression estimates a slope of 0.71 and the R2 of this regression
is 0.38. There are many reasons why we fail to match the aggregated trade flows perfectly. Our
costs are not intended to represent the costs at importing, but are instead the marginal costs the
firm uses for setting prices—including costs incurred internal to the market country. Moreover,
there is likely measurement error in both the aggregated trade flow data and in our data on market
shares and prices used to estimate our model.28 Finally, some mis-specification of our parametric
functional forms used in estimation is inevitable. Overall, we believe the fact that the implied flow
data matches the aggregate data as well as it does provides some degree of confidence that the
model is capturing the essential drivers of market outcomes.
4.6 Trade and Foreign Production Frictions
To get a sense for the magnitude of the estimated trade frictions, we conduct two exercises which
calculate the proportion of automobile costs that are due to external shipping and remote pro-
duction, and showcase how these quantities vary across brands and countries. Note that this
analysis computes costs actually paid in overcoming production frictions. It is not able to capture
the impact of production frictions which firms endogenously avoid (e.g., sourcing locally to avoid
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Figure 1: Predicted trade flows and data
28Moreover, our model prices, shares and characteristics are themselves aggregations of finer trim-level data on
new automobile sales.
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Table 15: Weighted average external shipping cost (percent of marginal cost)
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Fiat 0.0 4.8 2.3 2.7 2.2 3.8 1.2 2.5
Ford 0.2 3.9 0.7 2.2 3.3 2.5 4.1 3.3 0.2
GM 0.2 4.0 0.6 1.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.1 0.2
PSA 0.4 4.4 2.2 1.5 1.5 3.2 2.3
Toyota 0.3 6.0 0.9 3.8 3.9 3.3 4.3 3.8 1.1
VW 0.2 3.7 2.5 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.9 2.0 1.6
market to avoid high tari↵s and shipping costs). In the following section, we conduct a series of
counterfactuals which allow firms to re-optimize production decisions when frictions are removed.
Table 15 reflects the percentage of the total cost that is directly related to external shipping,
domesticity, and contiguity. In this exercise, we use the estimates from column IV of Table 14 to
calculate the proportion of costs paid which are due to shipping from an international location.
That is, we calculate the change in total costs when we set the domestic dummy equal to one,
the contiguity dummy equal to zero, and the distance between the assembly countries and the
destination market equal to the internal distance of the destination market. This calculation keeps
tari↵s, sourcing locations, and the distance between assembly and headquarters the same. We see
some variation by firm and country, ranging between 0 percent (Fiat in Brazil) to 6 percent (Toyota
in Belgium) of the marginal cost. As we would expect, these costs tend to be relatively low in the
firm’s home country, despite the fact that even home firms import at least some proportion of their
cars from abroad, generating positive external shipping costs. However, in Brazil, where many firms
have local plants targeting South American markets, average shipping costs are actually lower as a
share of costs than in home countries.29
Table 16 carries out a similar exercise by computing the proportion of costs due to sourcing from
assembly locations outside the firm’s headquarter country. In this case, we compute the proportion
of additional costs from assembling cars outside of the home headquarter country as a proportion
of the overall cost. Not surprisingly, these costs tend to be smallest in the firm’s home country,
although they are not zero since, again, firms source some models in home markets from abroad.
These costs range from about 0.1 to about 3.5 percent of marginal costs of supplying a model to a
29It is also interesting to note that General Motors has its lowest average shipping costs to European markets in
Germany, where its Opel subsidiary is based.
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Table 16: Weighted average remote production cost (percent of marginal cost)
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
Fiat 2.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 0.7 1.7
Ford 1.4 1.1 0.1 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.1
GM 1.3 1.3 0.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.1
PSA 2.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2
Toyota 3.5 1.7 2.6 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.0
VW 3.1 0.8 2.2 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 2.0
market. As with shipping costs, the case of Brazil is especially interesting since remote assembly
costs tend to be highest there. This is the flip side of the low shipping costs for the Brazilian
market observed in Table 15. Firms are endogenously choosing to locate assembly locations in
Brazil, incurring remote production costs instead of paying higher shipping costs and high import
tari↵s to access the Brazilian market.
5 What Drives Home Market Advantage?
In Section 2, we illustrated that firms tend to have substantially larger market shares in their home
market. In Sections 3 and 4, we proposed and estimated a structural model that accounts for various
demand and supply channels that could generate this home market advantage. These include tari↵s,
trade and remote production costs, cross-country heterogeneity in tastes for characteristics, and a
preference for domestic brands. In this section, we use these estimates to asses the role of each in
contributing to the home market advantage.
To do so, we re-estimate the same regression across a series of counterfactuals:
log(sjmt) =   · 1[b(j) is a home brand in m] + ↵j +  mt + "jmt, (13)
where the parameter   measures the extent of “home market advantage.” We do not interpret  
causally, but instead use it as a metric of how home brands correlate with higher market shares
in the data. At the structural estimates, prices and market shares exactly match the data, so the
results from this exercise under the baseline are equivalent to our preliminary analysis in Section
2 (Table 4, Column 3), which implies that being a home brand implies a 238 percent increase in
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market share over equivalent foreign brands. For each counterfactual, we recalculate equilibrium
costs, prices, and market shares, holding fixed model o↵erings within each market and the set of
available assembly locations for each model.30 However, we allow firms to re-optimize their sourcing
decisions from this set. Therefore, these counterfactuals should be interpreted as “medium run”
in the sense that firms can adjust sourcing and prices, but neither the entry/exit of models into
markets, nor the construction/closure of assembly plants. Using these counterfactual market shares,
we re-estimate (13) to determine the change in the home market advantage. Clearly, some of these
counterfactuals do not represent changes that are achievable via policy. However, our goal is to use
them as thought experiments to illustrate the drivers of home market advantage.
Table 17 displays the results. The first column reports the estimated coe cients under each
counterfactual. The second column reports the implied change in the market share di↵erence
between the baseline and the counterfactual estimate of  . We now discuss each of the scenarios
in turn.31
Supply We begin by examining supply side explanations for the home market advantage.
In general, we would expect trade and foreign investment decisions to lead to cost di↵erences that
favor home brands. However, we do account for the fact that some brands (particularly in Europe)
do assemble models abroad for the home market. Nonetheless, the home market advantage declines
in all of our scenarios where we remove supply side frictions.
We first consider the removal of all tari↵s on automobile trade. This results in a slight decline
in home market advantage of 4 percent. One reason for this is that many popular models of foreign
brands are either produced domestically or in countries where tari↵s are already low—if not zero—
due to regional free trade agreements. As a result, eliminating tari↵s has only minor e↵ect on
costs, which feeds through to a small decline in home market advantage. We get a stronger e↵ect
when we remove international trade frictions from the model—reducing shipping costs to their
domestic level regardless of location. This results in a 11.8 percent decline in the home market
advantage, the largest individual e↵ect we find on the cost side. This counterfactual both reduces
30As is well known, discrete choice demand models with consumer heterogeneity in tastes for characteristics and
price could have multiple equilibria in the pricing game. We have not found such multiple equilibria for our estimates,
but we also cannot rule out that they occur. We use the iterated best response algorithm starting from the initial
equilibrium in order to compute the new equilibrium.
31We present brand-country level market shares under each counterfactual in Appendix B. Price and profit out-
comes are available from the authors by request.
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Table 17: Home market advantage under counterfactual scenarios
Coe cient Home
  Market
Advantage
(% Chg)
Baseline 1.22
Supply:
All tari↵s eliminated 1.19 -4.0
No international trade frictions 1.13 -11.8
No multinational production frictions 1.21 -1.1
No tari↵s, trade or multinational production frictions 1.12 -12.9
Demand: Taste Heterogeneity for characteristics
All countries have French tastes for characteristics 1.19 -4.0
All countries have US tastes for characteristics 1.36 21.0
All countries have German gas prices 1.23 1.3
Demand: Home Preference
No home preference, homogeneous 0.63 -62.9
No home preference, country-specific 0.72 -55.6
No home preference, homogeneous, no local controls 0.32 -84.3
Notes: Change in market share gap is calculated following Kennedy (1981) and van Garderen and Shah
(2002), see footnote 7 for details.
shipping costs directly and allows firms to reallocate production to remote but productive assembly
locations. Removing the remote production friction from the model–eliminating costs associated
with the distance between assembly plants and headquarters location—has only a small e↵ect on
home market advantage, which declines by 1.1 percent. It is interesting that this e↵ect is less
than one-tenth the magnitude of that from removing trade frictions. Overall, when we remove all
cost-side frictions, the home market advantage estimate declines by 12.9 percent. This suggests
that cost-side drivers are an important but far from complete driver of home market advantage.
Taste heterogeneity for characteristics The impact of cross-country taste heterogeneity
on home market advantage is complex. While one might expect firms to produce cars with their
home market foremost in mind, firms can also customize model o↵erings as appropriate. This
activity is pervasive, as illustrated by Table B.1, which shows that all manufactures, regardless of
origin, sell larger, more powerful, less fuel-e cient cars in the United States than they do in Europe.
Moreover, firms may target di↵erent segments abroad than they do at home. US manufacturers
tend to sell smaller, more fuel-e cient cars in European countries than German manufacturers,
forgoing the large cars (mostly SUVs) that they choose to o↵er in the United States.
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Because of the complexity of model o↵erings across countries, a harmonization of characteristics
for tastes can have an ambiguous e↵ect on home market advantage in the medium run, depending on
how tastes are harmonized. To illustrate this, we conduct two counterfactuals where we harmonize
tastes in di↵erent ways by endowing all countries with the tastes of the United States and France
– two countries whose tastes di↵er dramatically with regard to fuel economy – as well as a third
counterfactual in which we harmonize gas prices in all countries to German prices, where gas is
the most expensive. Predictably, imposing US tastes on other countries leads to an increase in
the share (and profits) of fuel-ine cient cars, whereas imposing French tastes on the US leads to
an increase in the share of fuel-e cient cars (see Appendix Table B.6). However, the brands that
benefit in these experiments di↵er dramatically across countries. Imposing US tastes leads to a
dramatic increase in the share of German brands—who tend to o↵er less fuel-e cient vehicles—in
all countries except Brazil and the US. On the other hand, US brands—who tend to o↵er more fuel-
e cient cars abroad than at home—lose market share in all countries except Canada (and of course
the US). Similarly, the impact of harmonizing tastes to be as those in France primarily benefits
Japanese firms, who tend to o↵er relatively fuel e cient cars in all markets. As a result, we find
that the home market e↵ect can either be exacerbated or reduced by harmonizing characteristics
depending on how they are harmonized. In the cases presented here, imposing US tastes increases the
home market advantage by 21 percent (largely due to the experience of US brands) while imposing
French tastes decreases it by 4 percent. Raising gas prices to the German level doesn’t have a
big impact since gas prices show little variation within Europe. In the US, however, Japanese and
Korean makers of fuel-e cient models gain considerable market share at the expense of American
producers (bottom panel of Table B.4—Korean makers are in the “Other” category). European
producers also lose some market share since their product portfolio in the US market features
relatively larger models, plausibly in response to the cheaper price of gas.
Of course, like all our counterfactuals, these results represent a medium run approach where
firms cannot adjust product o↵erings. In the long run, firms would plausibly adjust their product
assortment in response to such dramatic changes in local tastes. Their ability to do so would
depend on the costs of customization. Estimating costs of customization would require a dynamic
model of equilibrium product characteristics (Eizenberg, 2014; Wollmann, 2014). High adjustment
costs would suggest a greater role for taste heterogeneity for home market advantage in the long
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Table 18: Value of domestic brand status for selected brands
Percent Change in
Price Quantity Profit
Seat in Spain (VW) -0.8 -69.6 -71.9
Vauxhall in UK (GM) -1.1 -53.6 -58.1
Chrysler in US (Fiat) -0.1 -14.0 -14.3
Opel in Germany (GM) -0.2 -13.8 -15.1
VW in Germany -0.4 -12.1 -14.2
Renault in France -2.1 -60.7 -66.4
Fiat in Italy -2.2 -50.5 -58.5
Chevrolet in US -0.2 -12.8 -14.2
run. However, the fact that firms do customize their product portfolios across markets, rather than
naively o↵er products that are popular at home, suggests that these customization costs are not
extreme. This cuts against the argument that taste heterogeneity is a key driver of home market
advantage in the long run, at least in the automobile industry.
Home preferences Finally, we remove consumers’ direct preference for home brands by
eliminating the structural home preference. The final panel of Tabel 17 presents this calculation
using two specifications, either treating the home preference as homogenous across countries (Table
9, Column IV) or as country specific (Table 10, Column II). Either way, we find that eliminating
home preference has a dramatic e↵ect on the home market advantage, which falls 56 to 63 percent.
Note that this calculation controls for the fact that home brands tend to have more dealerships
and a longer history in their own home country. Not including these controls (Table 9, Column I)
results in an even larger e↵ect: reducing home market advantage by 84 percent. This leads us to
conclude that demand-side e↵ects, and home brand preference in particular, are the key channel
that gives rise to home market advantage in the automobile industry in the medium run, while
cost-side elements play a substantive but secondary role.
An interesting feature of the automobile industry is that there have been several mergers where
an international firm owns a domestic brand but maintains its “domestic” image in marketing cam-
paigns (e.g., Volkswagen ownership of SEAT in Spain, GM’s ownership of Vauxhall and Opel in the
UK and Germany, and Fiat’s recent purchase of Chrysler in the United States). Our results suggest
that one benefit of operating “domestic” brands for foreign firms is due to consumers’ preferences
for local brands. Hence home preferences can provide a motive for foreign direct investment (via
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acquiring local brands), analogous to jumping tari↵s by establishing foreign production. To explore
this idea in more detail, we use our model to calculate the importance of brand-nationality to the
profitability of home brands. Specifically, we remove the home preference from only the brand
under consideration and re-calculate the equilibrium to see the impact of home preference on that
brand.32 Table 18 reports how removing home preference a↵ects local brands’ prices, sales and
profitability in their home country. The upper panel considers foreign-owned brands, while the
lower panel lists the largest home brand in the country.33 We find that home market advantage
is extremely important to domestic brand’s operating profits. Although firms do react to the loss
of home preference by lowering prices slightly, the reduction in profits is largely due to a dramatic
reduction in sales when the home preference is removed. The e↵ect varies substantially by brand.
The largest profit loss comes at the Spanish brand SEAT (72 percent), which is owned by Volkswa-
gen but has a relatively small presence worldwide. Despite being foreign-owned, SEAT appears to
actively cultivate a Spanish identity to the extent of o↵ering models named the Leon, Toledo, and
Alhambra. In contrast, Volkswagen itself—a strong worldwide brand—loses a comparably modest
14 percent of its local operating profits when its home preference is eliminated in Germany. In
summary, the impact of home preference does appear large enough to suggest that buying a local
brand may be an attractive mode of entry for foreign firms due to consumers’ innate preference for
local brands.
6 Conclusion
The automobile industry exhibits significant home market advantage in market shares. This paper
proposes and estimates a structural model to disentangle the contribution of various demand-
and cost-side elements to market outcomes. The estimates clearly establish the existence of both
demand factors and supply frictions behind the empirical regularity of home market advantage. On
the demand side, consumers exhibit strong preference for their domestic brands relative to how these
brands are viewed in the rest of the world even after controlling for car and brand characteristics.
Moreover, there are distinct di↵erences in tastes for characteristics across countries. On the cost
32For this exercise, we use country-specific home preference estimates from Table 10.
33SEAT and Vauxhall are both foreign owned and the largest brand in their home country, so we do not repeat
them.
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side, tari↵s, trade costs, and remote production costs all play a role in segmenting markets.
To establish the relative importance of these channels, we conduct a series of counterfactual
experiments where we see how a common measure of home market advantage is a↵ected by removing
a particular feature of the model. We find that home preference is a major driver of the home market
advantage, with an e↵ect at least four times larger than removing all cost-side frictions. This,
however, does not mean that other features are not important. In particular, our counterfactual
analysis focuses on the medium run, while other factors could play a large role in determining how
models are introduced into markets and where assembly locations are located.
Going forward, we believe this work opens up an exciting research agenda in the development
of brand preferences in international markets. To this end, one needs a longitudinal analysis of how
consumers’ preferences evolve over time—such as inheriting preferences across generations (Ander-
son, Kellogg, Langer, and Sallee 2013)—and how firms invest in product development, distribution
networks and marketing in response to these preferences in the presence of trade and multinational
production frictions that segment markets.
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Appendices
Appendix A Data
A.1 Demand Data
We purchased a data set of trim-level unit sales, prices (MSRP) and characteristics (size, weight,
horsepower, fuel type, transmission, wheel base) for nine markets (Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, US) and five years (2007-2011) from R.L.Polk & Company, a market
research firm that got acquired by IHS Inc. in 2013. Data for the years 2007 and 2008 are missing
for Brazil and Canada, respectively. Following the common practice in the literature, we aggregated
sales to the model level since very small market shares at the trim level create numerical challenges
for the BLP inversion. The aggregation used trim-level sales as weights to calculate average model
prices and characteristics. We fill in the few cases of missing characteristics (most notably in
Brazil), with the characteristics of the same models from the North American market. Prices at
local currencies were translated into USD using the average annual exchange rate. This procedure
generated 9498 observations. We dropped pickup trucks since they constitute a somewhat unique
segment in the US. We also dropped observations for 2010-2011 in Canada since information on SUV
models sold there in these years was missing. This leaves us with 8835 observations. Additional
data comes from OECD (sales tax data) and the World Bank (per capita income, Gini coe cients).
A.2 Supply Data
To locate the production locations of unique model-year combinations in the demand data, we
purchased data on assembly plants by manufacturer groups and models between 2007-2011 from
Ward’s Communications. Assembly countries for model-years present in the demand data but
missing in the purchased supply data were collected by research assistants from the Internet. The
complete supply data encompasses 52 assembly countries. The models produced in Uruguay belong
to the Chinese brand Geely for which fuel e ciency measures are missing. As a result, we drop
Uruguay as an assembly location. Also, data for Kenya and Bangladesh overlap in that Toyota
Land Cruiser is the only model produced in these countries. Since this leads to multicollinearity in
estimating model and production location fixed e↵ects, we drop Bangladesh. This leaves us with
50 countries from which the models in the demand data could be supplied. The countries in which
manufacturer groups are headquartered constitutes another dimension of the data, which is more
easily accessible from online sources. There are 12 headquarter countries associated with the 28
manufacturing groups: China, Germany, Spain, France, the UK, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
Russia, Sweden and the US.34 The CEPII dataset (Head and Mayer 2013) provides us with the
distances between headquarter and assembly countries, as well as the distance and the contiguity
of our nine markets to assembly countries. Bilateral tari↵ data come from TARIC (EU Integrated
Tari↵ Database), Canada Border Services Agency, USITC and WITS databases. Most of the
bilateral tari↵s were constant throughout the data period with two exceptions. The entry of Ukraine
to the WTO led to a reduction of US tari↵s from 10% to the MFN level of 2.5%. EU tari↵s to S.
Korea decreased from 10% to 3% in 2011 when a free trade agreement became e↵ective. We ignore
34For two manufacturing groups, Chrysler-Fiat and Renault-Nissan, we assigned each firm a separate headquarter
country: Chrysler in the US and Fiat in Italy, Renault in France and Nissan in Japan. During this period, key
managerial decisions at Chrysler were still made in Detroit and the merger of the two companies wasn’t legally
complete until 2014. Similarly, while the Renault-Nissan alliance coordinates on global procurement, production and
marketing, they still keep their separate management structures and brand identities.
rules of origin requirements related to the regional value-added content in FTAs: for instance,
according to NAFTA rules, a car can be imported from Mexico to the US tari↵-free only if the
regional value added content is above 62.5%. The rest is subject to tari↵. Unfortunately, systematic
model-level data on location-specific value-added is not available. In our cost estimation (subsection
4.5 ), we make an attempt to account for the fact that only a fraction of an imported car’s cost is
subject to import tari↵s.
In order to investigate the sources of the brand-country fixed e↵ects from the demand estimation,
we supplement the demand data with information on brands’ year of entry into and the number of
their dealers in each of our 9 markets. The year-of-entry data was collected by consulting various
sources including the Internet, business history books and companies’ public relations agents. Data
regarding the number of dealers was collected from Google Maps. There are 331 brand-country
observations.
The number of car dealers for a manufacturer brand within a country is collected using Google
Places API (https://developers.google.com/places/webservice/search?hl=en). This API
provides a function called radar search that returns the search query given the key words, place
types, center coordinates and radius of the area of interest. The query has detailed information
including place id that can uniquely identify a place, coordinates and description. There is a limit
for the number of results returned per search (200) and also the radius (50km). We set the keyword
to be the name of manufacturer brand and the place type to be “car dealer”.35 Then we iterated
over areas to cover the entire country by choosing di↵erent coordinate centers and set the radius
to 50km. The area may cover places outside of the country, in which case we removed these results
based on their coordinates. There may also be overlapped area search in the search iteration, and
we removed the repeated results using place id. To avoid counting dealers of used cars, we did a
radar search using used car as the keyword, and deleted a place if its id is found in the used car
list.
Appendix B Additional Figures and Tables
The following tables present market shares from the baseline model (which exactly matches share
and price data at the model level) and the counterfactual scenarios we consider. Data is aggregated
according to brand nationality.
35Because Opel is a common place name in some countries, we use “Opel dealer” instead of “Opel” in the search
where “dealer” is translated into the local language.
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Figure B.1: Models and Market Shares by Number of Assembly Countries
Table B.1: Characteristics by Market
Variable I II III
ln(hppwtjmt) ln(sizejmt) ln(mpgjmt)
BEL -0.276 -0.00876 0.251
(0.00583) (0.00118) (0.00616)
BRA -0.0444 0.00308 0.187
(0.0111) (0.00307) (0.00830)
CAN -0.000410 0.000774 0.0160
(0.00572) (0.00108) (0.00546)
DEU -0.195 -0.00600 0.155
(0.00571) (0.00106) (0.00604)
ESP -0.228 -0.00667 0.226
(0.00573) (0.00117) (0.00613)
FRA -0.239 -0.00648 0.265
(0.00582) (0.00113) (0.00610)
GBR -0.210 -0.00758 0.187
(0.00581) (0.00107) (0.00618)
ITA -0.235 -0.00840 0.227
(0.00577) (0.00111) (0.00612)
Observations 8835 8835 8835
R2 0.952 0.985 0.928
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Model FE Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. US is the omitted dummy, so all
coe cients showcase di↵erences in country means against the US.
Table B.2: Data: average area-level market shares of brand nationality across markets (%)
Data/Baseline
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 31.2 8.9 34.1 8.3 11.3 6.6 15.9 11.6 39.6
EU brands 56.4 75.7 8.5 77.0 70.6 82.6 62.8 74.0 9.5
JPN brands 8.3 11.3 48.3 10.9 13.1 8.8 16.9 11.5 42.9
Other brands 4.1 4.0 9.1 3.7 5.1 2.0 4.3 2.9 7.9
Home brands 55.4 9.0 52.3 18.2 30.3 39.6
Table B.3: Supply counterfactuals: Average area-level market shares of brand nationality across
markets (%)
No tari↵s
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 26.7 10.1 29.7 9.6 13.0 7.0 18.5 13.6 37.3
EU brands 47.2 71.6 10.6 72.9 65.8 81.3 56.9 69.9 11.2
JPN brands 6.9 13.4 48.7 13.2 14.9 9.4 19.6 13.1 42.6
Other brands 19.2 4.9 11.0 4.3 6.2 2.3 5.0 3.5 8.9
Home brands 50.7 5.9 53.3 13.2 27.4 37.3
No international trade frictions
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 30.9 9.3 31.8 9.1 12.3 6.8 17.4 12.6 37.1
EU brands 55.6 73.2 9.6 73.9 67.3 81.5 59.3 71.7 10.6
JPN brands 8.1 13.0 48.5 13.0 14.7 9.5 18.6 12.6 43.8
Other brands 5.4 4.5 10.1 4.1 5.7 2.2 4.7 3.2 8.6
Home brands 51.3 6.7 52.4 14.8 28.6 37.1
No multinational production frictions
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 30.9 9.9 33.0 9.3 12.0 7.1 16.9 12.5 38.2
EU brands 56.5 74.3 8.7 75.6 69.5 81.7 61.7 72.6 9.9
JPN brands 8.9 11.5 49.2 11.2 13.2 9.1 16.9 11.8 44.3
Other brands 3.7 4.3 9.1 3.9 5.3 2.1 4.4 3.1 7.6
Home brands 53.9 8.7 52.0 18.9 29.1 38.2
No tari↵s, trade or multinational production frictions
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 25.7 10.7 27.1 10.4 13.8 7.4 20.0 14.7 33.9
EU brands 44.8 71.8 12.0 72.2 65.5 81.1 55.8 68.8 12.7
JPN brands 7.7 12.8 49.0 13.2 14.8 9.2 19.2 13.0 43.6
Other brands 21.8 4.7 12.0 4.2 6.0 2.3 5.0 3.5 9.7
Home brands 50.3 3.7 53.8 10.4 25.6 33.9
Table B.4: Taste heterogeneity counterfactuals: Average area-level market shares of brand nation-
ality across markets (%)
All countries have French tastes for characteristics
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 35.7 5.6 16.5 8.8 6.5 6.6 12.2 11.8 13.5
EU brands 57.6 73.8 6.8 71.5 68.1 82.6 56.7 69.4 1.9
JPN brands 4.6 17.2 62.7 13.8 21.7 8.8 20.6 13.9 69.3
Other brands 2.1 3.4 14.0 5.8 3.8 2.0 10.5 4.9 15.2
Home brands 42.3 8.1 52.3 11.8 31.2 13.5
All countries have US tastes for characteristics
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 24.3 3.6 34.5 4.3 6.5 2.8 9.1 8.0 39.6
EU brands 59.4 85.0 30.0 87.4 67.8 86.5 73.7 75.4 9.5
JPN brands 13.8 9.4 34.4 7.5 20.7 9.2 15.6 13.6 42.9
Other brands 2.5 2.1 1.0 0.8 5.0 1.5 1.6 3.0 7.9
Home brands 80.4 0.3 11.4 21.6 28.1 39.6
All countries have German gas prices
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 32.0 8.9 34.9 8.3 10.1 6.6 16.0 11.5 35.1
EU brands 55.3 75.8 8.7 77.0 69.1 82.6 62.9 74.2 8.5
JPN brands 8.5 11.3 47.7 10.9 16.2 8.8 16.9 11.4 46.0
Other brands 4.2 4.0 8.7 3.7 4.6 2.0 4.3 2.9 10.3
Home brands 55.4 9.0 52.2 18.2 30.4 35.1
Table B.5: Home preference counterfactuals: Average area-level market share of brands across
markets (in percentage)
No home preference, homogeneous, with brand-market controls
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 31.2 8.9 34.1 10.9 11.7 8.5 17.4 13.2 26.1
EU brands 56.4 75.7 8.5 70.2 69.3 76.9 59.3 70.2 12.1
JPN brands 8.3 11.3 48.3 14.3 13.6 11.9 18.7 13.2 52.2
Other brands 4.1 4.0 9.1 4.6 5.3 2.7 4.7 3.4 9.5
Home brands 41.5 4.8 37.8 10.4 20.8 26.1
No home preference, country-specific, with brand-market controls
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 31.2 8.9 34.1 9.1 12.0 9.9 17.7 13.9 36.2
EU brands 56.4 75.7 8.5 75.1 68.7 72.9 58.4 68.6 10.2
JPN brands 8.3 11.3 48.3 11.9 13.8 14.1 19.1 14.0 45.3
Other brands 4.1 4.0 9.1 4.0 5.5 3.1 4.7 3.6 8.3
Home brands 51.4 2.8 27.9 8.6 16.9 36.2
No home preference, homogeneous, no brand-market controls
BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 31.2 8.9 34.1 12.2 11.9 9.5 18.0 14.0 20.1
EU brands 56.4 75.7 8.5 66.7 68.9 74.1 57.9 68.4 13.3
JPN brands 8.3 11.3 48.3 16.0 13.8 13.5 19.3 14.0 56.3
Other brands 4.1 4.0 9.1 5.1 5.4 3.0 4.8 3.6 10.3
Home brands 34.4 3.4 30.6 7.6 16.4 20.1
Table B.6: Taste counterfactuals: Change in market share (in percentage points)
Change to French Tastes BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands 4.5 -3.3 -17.6 0.5 -4.8 -3.8 0.2 -26.1
FRA brands 1.0 -4.5 3.1 -4.2 3.9 0.3
DEU brands -3.5 1.5 -1.4 -13.1 5.7 -3.0 -6.0 -6.2
JPN brands -3.7 5.8 14.4 2.9 8.6 3.7 2.4 26.4
Other brands 1.8 0.4 4.5 6.6 -5.3 -0.8 3.1 5.9
Home brands -13.1 -0.9 -6.3 0.9 -26.1
High-e ciency modelsa 3.5 31.1 36.8 11.5 23.2 21.8 10.7 46.3
Change to US Tastes BRA BEL CAN DEU ESP FRA GBR ITA USA
US brands -6.9 -5.3 0.5 -4.1 -4.7 -3.8 -6.8 -3.6
FRA brands -5.9 -14.4 -7.0 -22.8 -40.9 -8.1 -3.5
DEU brands 1.6 25.0 16.0 25.0 27.2 40.0 16.9 6.2
JPN brands 5.5 -2.0 -13.8 -3.4 7.7 0.4 -1.3 2.1
Other brands 5.6 -3.3 -2.6 -10.4 -7.3 4.3 -0.7 -1.3
Home brands 25.0 -8.8 -40.9 3.4 -2.2
High-e ciency modelsa -35.4 -35.2 -38.5 -44.8 -47.3 -47.5 -33.5 -23.8
a High-e ciency models are those above the share-weighted median fuel e ciency for that country.
